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1. Introduction 
For a seller it is essential to find an optimal pricing strategy for her products because the 
pricing mechanism determines the seller’s revenue and profit. Recently, Pay-What-You-
Want (PWYW) pricing has attracted considerable empirical research. PWYW pricing is a 
form of participative pricing (Chandran and Morwitz 2005) in which the buyer can choose 
any price. In some cases, a positive minimum price is set but, mostly, buyers are free to pay 
any price including zero. 
Research on PWYW pricing often refers to the literature on experimental 
economics. First, results from experimental economics show that behavior deviates from 
the Homo Oeconomicus model (maximization of the personal payoff). Motivations, such as 
fairness, inequity aversion, or reciprocity drive behavior in the laboratory, and it is argued 
that these motivations are likely to affect buyers’ behavior in PWYW pricing (e.g., Kim, 
Natter and Spann 2009, Schons et al. 2013, Kim, Kaufmann and Stegemann 2014, Kunter 
2015). Second, results from experimental economics reveal similarities between specific 
games investigated in the laboratory and the application of PWYW in the field (e.g., Jang 
and Chu 2012, Schmidt, Spann and Zeithammer 2014). The two games that are mentioned 
most frequently are the dictator game (DG) and the trust game (TG), which we explain 
below. 
Although many authors have mentioned the relation between a typical PWYW 
transaction and the dictator and the trust game, this relation has not been discussed in detail. 
The first goal of this paper is to introduce the PWYW Game. Using the PWYW Game, we 
illustrate the PWYW pricing situation as a sequential one shot game and discuss its relation 
to dictator and trust games. Since the DG and the TG are subgames of the PWYW Game, a 
closer look at the results from laboratory experiments can inform sellers about the 
applicability of PWYW pricing. By scrutinizing the results derived from the DG and the 
TG game, we expose the factors that are likely to contribute to higher prices under PWYW 
pricing. To outline these factors is the second goal of the paper. 
From a seller’s perspective, PWYW pricing can be used as a short-term marketing 
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strategy, drawing attention to a new product (e.g., Kim, Natter and Spann 2014), or as a 
long-term pricing strategy (e.g., Riener and Traxler 2012). The literature on PWYW pricing 
has not fully addressed the topic of PWYW pricing as a long-term pricing strategy yet. 
Most studies refer to one-shot games and hence neglect repeated interactions between buyer 
and seller (Greiff and Egbert 2016). Repeated games typically lead to other forms of 
cooperation and other equilibria as compared to one-shot games. The third goal of this 
paper is to outline the factors that are essential variables for the success of PWYW pricing 
in the long-term. The latter is particularly relevant for the application of PWYW pricing in 
practice. To identify the factors that affect individual behavior in repeated games are crucial 
when the PWYW pricing mechanism is intended not just to raise the awareness for a new 
product, but to be regarded as a long-term pricing strategy. The central implication of this 
study is that the results from experimental economics can provide guidance to develop 
applications of PWYW pricing in real business contexts. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the relation between PWYW 
pricing and the DG and the TG. This is done in three steps. In section 2.1, we provide a 
survey of the PWYW literature in which both games have been mentioned. In section 2.2, 
we introduce the PWYW Game, which depicts a PWYW transaction between a seller and a 
single buyer. Based on the PWYW Game, we describe how the DG and the TG relate to 
PWYW pricing in section 2.3. In section 3, we discuss three factors which drive individual 
behavior in the dictator and the trust game. These factors are related to a single interaction 
between a buyer and a seller. The factors are (i) social context, (ii) social information, and 
(iii) deservingness. In reality, however, many interactions are repeated, and behavior in 
repeated games can differ from behavior in one-shot games. We tackle this issue in section 
4 by elaborating on some results from repeated DG and TG. Based on this discussion, we 
identify (iv) communication and (v) the reduction of goal conflicts as factors that are likely 
to be relevant for the success of PWYW pricing in the long run. In section 5, we conclude. 
2. Parallels between Economic Experiments and PWYW Pricing 
Our first goal is an examination of two traditional economic experiments, the DG and the 
TG, sometimes also called investment game. The DG and the TG are strongly related to 
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PWYW pricing because there is a striking similarity between the decision making process 
in a PWYW transaction and in the DG and the TG. However, these similarities have not 
been discussed yet. 
Despite their simplicity, the DG and the TG depict important aspects of PWYW 
pricing. And although most empirical investigations of these games have relied on student 
subjects and have been conducted in abstract laboratory environments, the similarities 
regarding the behavioral regularities in the laboratory and in PWYW pricing are 
remarkably strong. Hence, we argue that abstract laboratory experiments with student 
subjects can generate useful insights for business applications of PWYW pricing and can 
also be used as a guide for further research. 
2.1 Dictator and Trust Games in the Literature on PWYW Pricing 
In order to illustrate that the relation between a PWYW pricing situation and the DG and 
the TG has not been investigated in detail yet, we briefly review the papers that refer both 
to the DG or the TG and to PWYW pricing. Greiff and Egbert (2016) and Krzyżanowska 
and Tkaczyk (2016) review the empirical studies on PWYW pricing between 2009 and 
2015. A subset of the studies summarized by Greiff and Egbert mention the DG or the TG, 
and some elaborate on the link between PWYW pricing and the experimental literature. 
These papers are listed alphabetically in Table 1. 
Most of the above studies refer to findings of the DG. Particularly, the role of 
anonymity for payments is emphasized (e.g., Regner and Riener 2012, Machado and Sinha 
2013) and analyzed (e.g., Jang and Chu 2012). If social interaction is allowed in a PWYW 
setting, higher payments are the result (Hilbert and Suessmair 2015). Overall, the studies 
either show or emphasize that in PWYW situations other regarding preferences, such as 
fairness considerations or altruism, and identity play a role. 
With respect to the TG two studies are remarkable. Schmidt, Spann, and 
Zeithammer (2014) explicitly implement the TG in a laboratory experiment in order to 
simulate PWYW pricing situations in different market environments. Léon, Noguera, and 
Tena-Sánchez (2012) report a case study on selling holiday packages via PWYW pricing.  
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Table 1: Dictator and Trust Games in the PWYW Pricing Literature 
Author(s) Experiment  Reference to DG or TG 
Armstrong 
Soule and 
Madrigal 2015 
Hypothetical PWYW decisions 
with respect to concert tickets. 
Authors mention that DG and public good 
games regularly show that subjects do not 
maximize their payoffs. 
Gautier and van 
der Klaauw 
2010 
In a case study authors analyze 
voluntary payments for hotel stays 
in a name-your-own-price context. 
Authors mention that the situation in the case 
study has similarities with gift exchange and 
tipping games and also with the DG and TG. 
Results of DG, i.e. positive payments, are 
confirmed.  
Hilbert and 
Suessmair 2015 
In an experiment the willingness to 
pay for a travel mug is examined 
with respect to social interaction. 
Authors find that social interaction leads to 
higher payments, similar to findings in DG. 
Jang and Chu 
2012 
In a field experiment subjects can 
buy canned coffee. In survey 
experiments subjects are asked for 
their willingness to pay and the 
price they would pay under PWYW 
pricing. 
Authors explicitly relate PWYW to DG and 
explanations given in the experimental literature, 
such as fairness. They find that the distribution 
of the ration between prices paid and willingness 
to pay is similar to the distribution of offer and 
endowment in DG. 
Kim, 
Kaufmann, and 
Stegemann 2014 
Online survey and field 
experiments are used to test 
different influences on PWYW 
pricing. 
Ultimatum game and DG are discussed and set 
in the context of PWYW pricing, particularly 
emphasized are social distance and fairness. 
Kim, Natter, 
and Spann 2009; 
2010 
In field experiments payments for a 
buffet lunch in a restaurant, cinema 
tickets and hot beverages (2009), 
and for restaurant meals (2010) are 
investigated. 
DG is mentioned with respect to fairness 
concerns and altruism (2009). 
Ultimatum game and DG are discussed and set 
in the context of PWYW (2010). 
León, Noguera 
and Tena-
Sánchez 
2012 
Test of PWYW pricing in a case 
study with holiday packages. 
The authors explicitly refer to their PWYW case 
study as a TG with assigned roles of seller and 
customers. They also provide a simple game-
theoretic model. 
Machado and 
Sinha 2013 
Authors test PWYW in laboratory 
experiment and field experiment for 
different goods. 
Authors hint that anonymity reduces altruism in 
the DG. 
Regner and 
Riener 2012 
Case study on online music 
downloads. 
Authors accentuate anonymity in DG and relate 
it to PWYW. 
Santana and 
Morwitz 2013 
Case study on payments of 
adoption fees at animal shelter. 
Authors point out that PWYW is similar to the 
DG. 
Schmidt, Spann 
and Zeithammer 
2014 
In laboratory experiments different 
market structures and market entry 
decisions are tested with a varying 
number of sellers and buyers. 
The PWYW experiments can be considered as 
repeated TG with three trustees and a seller who 
invests in quality. 
Schons et al. 
2013 
In a field experiment multiple 
customer–seller transactions are 
examined. 
Authors state that in a PWYW situation free 
riding occurs less often than in a DG.  
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They explicitly model a TG and relate the game to their case study. The results of 
the case study show that with respect to revenues PWYW pricing is devastating from a 
business perspective. 
There are also some references to the ultimatum game (e.g., Kim, Natter, and Spann 
2009, 2010, Gneezy et al. 2012). They refer to altruism and fairness. Motivations which 
affect behavior in the ultimatum game might also affect buyers’ decisions in PWYW 
transactions but the PWYW pricing situation does not resemble an ultimatum game. Hence, 
we do not elaborate on this game. Next, we introduce the PWYW Game before we discuss 
its relation to the DG and the TG in section 2.3. 
2.2 The PWYW Game 
The PWYW Game is a sequential game, which represents a typical PWYW interaction 
between a seller and a buyer. Figure 1 presents the extensive form of the game. First, the 
seller chooses the pricing mechanism (fixed price vs. PWYW) and product quality (high vs. 
low). Then, the buyer decides whether to buy or not. In case she decides to buy the good 
under PWYW, she also chooses price p. 
At node 1 the seller chooses traditional pricing, e.g. a fixed price (the left part of the 
game tree), or PWYW pricing (the right part of the game tree). At nodes 2 and 3, the seller 
chooses high or low quality. (For the sake of simplicity, we assume that quality can be high 
or low, but in principle, quality can also be continuous.) At nodes 4 and 6 the seller chooses 
the price at which she intends to sell the good. At nodes 8 and 9 the buyer decides whether 
to buy the good or not. Nodes 5 and 7 depict the buyer’s price choice if PWYW pricing is 
chosen. 
The first payoff refers to the seller. For one unit of a good the payoff is ‘price being 
paid’ minus costs. The payoff is zero if the buyer does not purchase and it is negative if 
price being paid does not cover costs. The second payoff refers to the buyer. It is 
determined as her willingness to pay (WTP) minus the price being paid. 
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Figure 1: Sequential Pricing and Buying Decision: The PWYW Game 
 
 
2.3 The Dictator Game (DG) and the Trust Game (TG) 
In the DG (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986, Forsythe et al. 1994) there are two 
players, dictator and receiver. The dictator has the power to allocate a given endowment 
between herself and a receiver. The receiver has no choice but to accept the dictator’s offer. 
Game theory predicts that dictators, who want to maximize their personal payoffs, keep 
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their endowment completely and transfer nothing to the receiver. 
General results: Results reveal that the majority of dictators do not maximize their 
payoffs. Instead, most dictators transfer positive amounts to recipients (for surveys see 
Camerer 2003, chap. 2; Cárdenas and Carpenter 2008; and Engel 2011 for a meta-analysis). 
The average transfer is 20 percent of the endowment (Camerer 2003, 56). Since in an 
anonymous one-shot game strategic concerns are absent, the common interpretation of 
dictators’ behavior is that dictators have other-regarding preferences. They are altruistic and 
care about recipients’ incomes. 
Application to PWYW: The DG is a highly stylized version of a buyer’s decision 
about how much to pay in a PWYW mechanism. In the PWYW Game (Figure 1), the sub-
games starting at nodes 5 and 7 are dictator games. The buyer’s (seller’s) role in the 
PWYW Game corresponds to the dictator’s (receiver’s) role in the DG. The buyer, who has 
received the product, decides about how much to pay for it. Hence, the dictator’s transfer 
corresponds to the price paid. The amount of money available to the buyer corresponds to 
the dictator’s endowment. 
In the DG, a positive transfer implies a positive income for the receiver. Applied to 
PWYW this, however, does not mean that a seller makes a profit if the buyer pays a 
positive price. Only if the price paid is above the seller’s marginal cost (p > c), the seller 
makes positive profit. If p < c, the seller incurs a loss. Indeed, in contrast to the standard 
DG where the minimal payoff of the receiver is zero, in a PWYW situation the payoff for 
the receiver may be negative in case a buyer pays less than the marginal cost. 
The TG was introduced by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). Two players, a 
trustor and a trustee interact. Player 1, the trustor, has endowment X and chooses to invest T 
≤ X. T earns an interest at the rate r (exogenously given). Player 2, the trustee, receives the 
investment plus interest T+rT=(1+r)T. Next, she decides how much to return to the trustor. 
Let Y denote the amount the trustee keeps for herself, so that she returns (1+r)T-Y. Payoffs 
are X + rT – Y for the trustor and Y for the trustee. 
Assuming that both players maximize their monetary payoffs, the trustee returns 
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nothing. This will be anticipated by the trustor, who invests nothing. This subgame perfect 
equilibrium is inefficient. 
General results: In Berg et al.’s experiment trustors and trustees were endowed with 
X = 10. Investments were exogenously tripled by the experimenter, r = 2. On average, 
trustees invested about half of their endowment. Trustors returned, on average, slightly less 
than the invested amount. If we take a closer look at the trustees’ decisions in experiments, 
we find that about half of the trustees returned zero or one ((1+r)T-Y=0 or (1+r)T-Y=1). 
This implies that the other half of trustees returned more than the amount invested by the 
trustors ((1+r)T-Y>T). Similar results have been obtained in other TG experiments (see, 
e.g., the survey of Bolle 1998, Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and Boeing 2000, Camerer 2003, chap. 
2.7). 
The typical interpretation is that the trustor’s decision is a signal of trust and the 
trustee’s decision is a signal of trustworthiness. Based on this interpretation the typical 
results about trustees’ behavior can be rephrased. About half of the trustees betray the 
trustors’ trustworthiness and return (almost) nothing, while the other half of the trustees 
honor trust by returning more than the investment, i.e., by choosing rT > Y. 
The decision to honor trust can be motivated by positive reciprocity, i.e., a 
propensity to reward friendly behavior (see Albert et al. 2007, for a survey Fehr and 
Gächter 2000). As in the DG, altruism can also be a motivation. However, the observation 
that the amount returned by trustees in the TG exceeds the amount given by dictators in the 
DG, makes it likely that altruism is not the only explanation. 
Application to PWYW: How does the TG relate to the PWYW Game? In the 
PWYW Game (Figure 1), the subgame starting at node 3 is a TG in which player 1 is the 
seller and player 2 is the buyer. In this subgame, the seller chooses the quality of the 
product before the buyer agrees on a transaction and chooses a price. Assume that the 
buyer’s utility is given by the difference between her willingness-to-pay WTP and the price 
p. Hence, her utility is given by u = WTP – p = (1+r)T - Y with WTP = (1+r)T and Y = p. 
A possible interpretation is that T reflects the seller’s marginal cost, which is 
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increasing in quality (cl < ch). X corresponds to the cost of producing an additional unit of 
the good in the highest quality. Higher choices of quality result in better products, so that 
WTP = (1+r)T increases in quality (WTPl < WTPh). In the standard TG, r > 0, hence (1+r)T 
> T. This implies that a buyer’s WTP always exceeds the seller’s cost. However, for players 
with a WTP below marginal cost, the TG is not appropriate. A modified version of the TG, 
which we sketch in the next paragraph, can be used to analyze this case. 
One way to modify the TG and to include buyers whose WTP is below the seller’s 
cost, is to relax the assumption that r is positive. The modified TG with r < 0 depicts a 
transaction of a buyer and a seller with WTP < c. In such a game, either the buyer or the 
seller incurs a loss if a transaction takes place, regardless of the price. The seller makes a 
loss if p < WTP and the buyer realizes a loss if p > WTP. 
In the PWYW Game, the seller is at risk of making a loss. A loss would occur if the 
price paid is below the seller's cost, p < c. If the price that a buyer is willing to pay is below 
the seller’s cost, as it is likely to be the case in the modified TG where WTP < c, the buyer 
might refuse to buy the good. Fairness or image concerns might prevent these buyers from 
buying at all (see Gneezy et al. 2012 for empirical evidence). This outside option of 
refusing to buy the good is possible in PWYW transactions but not included in the DG, the 
TG and the PWYW game, as discussed in this paper. A detailed discussion of sorting and 
partner choice is beyond the scope of this paper (for a discussion of DG and TG with 
sorting see Slonim and Garbarino 2008, or Lazear, Malmendier and Weber 2012). 
3. Factors Driving Behavior 
The DG and the TG are theoretical models depicting various aspects of PWYW 
transactions. They help to identify variables that have also an influence on similar decisions 
outside the laboratory. For the DG, Camerer (2003), Cárdenas and Carpenter (2008), and 
Engel (2011) list a considerable number of explanatory variables that affect transfers. 
Camerer (2003) also records a large number of explanatory variables that affect behavior in 
the TG. Among these variables are (i) social context, (ii) social information, and (iii) 
deservingness. These three variables essentially affect behavior in the DG and the TG and 
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are also likely to be of relevance in PWYW pricing. Next, we examine these three 
variables. 
3.1 Social Context 
Social context includes features such as anonymity, social distance, and communication. 
Social context matters in PWYW because the strength of subjects’ social preferences varies 
with the context. Several experiments have shown that behavior in the DG and TG is highly 
sensitive to the social context in which the decision is made. Three explanations are at 
hand. 
Firstly, in the DG social context determines the relation between the dictator and the 
experimenter. For instance, Hoffman et al. (1994, 1996), Franzen and Pointner (2012 show 
that increasing the dictator’s anonymity vis-à-vis the experimenter reduces transfers. This 
implies that if anonymity is not given and the experimenter is able to observe transfers, 
positive transfers might be driven by social image concerns, i.e., the desire to appear fair to 
the experimenter. Although there is no experimenter in PWYW transactions, third parties, 
like fellow buyers, neighbors, or citizens, might observe buyers’ payment. Hence, the 
degree of anonymity could influence buyers’ behavior. 
Secondly, social context determines the relation between both players (dictator and 
recipient in the DG, trustor and trustee in the TG). Bohnet and Frey (1999) systematically 
vary anonymity between the dictator and the recipient and show that loosening anonymity 
(by allowing for silent identification or communication) increases transfers. If subjects are 
allowed to communicate before the decisions are made, dictators are more generous 
(Bohnet and Frey 1999). For the TG, Ben-Ner, Putterman, and Ren (2011) argue that 
communication results in non-binding agreements and leads to an increase in trusting 
behavior and trustworthiness. 
Closely related to the effect of communication is the effect of social distance. 
Several TG experiments (e.g., Fershtman and Gneezy 2001; Glaeser et al. 2000 for related 
survey evidence) find that trust and trustworthiness is inversely related to social distance. 
The higher the social distance, the lower the trust and trustworthiness is. Social distance can 
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be considered to be low if both players are of the same nationality or the same ethnicity. 
Bouckaert and Dhaene (2004) conducted a TG with Turkish and Belgian businessmen from 
Ghent and found no effect of ethnic origin. A possible explanation for this is that all 
subjects share the same identity, namely being businessman from Ghent. Possibly, the 
shared identity as businessman from Ghent dominated the effect of differences in ethnicity. 
A possible explanation for the effect of social context on behavior is that other-
regarding preferences or social image concerns become stronger if anonymity if loosened, 
or, if social distance decreases (see also Andreoni and Bernheim 2009). This is of relevance 
for PWYW, especially if the goods are services, because most transactions are personal 
interactions in which there are ample opportunities for communication between buyer and 
seller (see Kim, Natter and Spann 2009). Regner and Riener (2012) also show that 
voluntary payment for music downloads increases when anonymity is reduced, i.e. when 
the name and email-address of the buyer is revealed to the artist. 
Thirdly, social context determines how players perceive the relation between action 
and outcome. For instance, Dana, Weber, and Kuang (2007) show that dictators choose 
smaller transfers if moral excuses for selfish behavior are available. In one treatment, 
dictators choose between a fair (5,5) and an unfair allocation (6,1), but if they do not make 
a choice within an unspecified time limit (between 0 and 10 seconds), one allocation is 
randomly selected. The receiver is not informed about whether the decision was made by 
the dictator or randomly. Compared to a control treatment without moral excuses, dictators 
chose the unfair allocation more frequently, possibly because the design of the experiment 
allowed dictators to be selfish without appearing unfair. Dana et al. argue that this behavior 
is motivated by social image and self image concerns. This implies that even in double-
blind experiments, where the experimenter cannot observe transfers, image concerns affect 
behavior because dictators reflect on their own behavior (i.e., self image concerns) and 
recipients observe dictators’ transfers (i.e., social image concerns). 
These findings seem to be relevant for PWYW situations. In most PWYW 
transactions, sellers have some control over the social context in which the transaction takes 
place. If we assume that a buyer’s behavior is driven by self image concerns, then the 
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buyer’s perception of the goal of the PWYW transaction is crucial. For instance, if a buyer 
expects that a seller uses PWYW pricing as a promotional tool with the goal of bringing 
attention to the good, the buyer may conclude that paying nothing is fair. The good may be 
perceived as a free sample offer. However, if a buyer expects that the seller uses PWYW 
pricing as a long-term business model, she might conclude that paying nothing is unfair. 
3.2 Social Information 
By social information we mean information about the behavior of other players who do not 
directly affect the outcome of the game. In the DG such players can be dictators who have 
played the game before. Cason and Mui (1998) and Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2011) illustrate 
that social information affects dictators’ behavior. In both experiments, the DG is played 
twice. In each game, dictators face different opponents. After the first game, dictators are 
informed about other dictators’ behavior in the first game, and this information affects their 
behavior in the second game. It is plausible that social information influences behavior 
because dictators experience discomfort when disagreeing with the majority (a preference 
for conformity), or because dictators are uncertain about the appropriate behavior. 
Not only in the DG but also in the TG behavior is sensitive to social information. 
Information about the choices of trustors and trustees, who have already played the game, 
can signal the existence of a norm. Berg et al. (1995, 132) argue that the salience of the 
internalized norm increases when subjects have already played the game. Results show that 
when social information is provided, trustworthiness increases (e.g., Berg et al. 1995, 
Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and Boeing 2000). 
In a PWYW context this is important since it is possible that buyers observe prices 
paid by others (e.g., Racherla, Babb, and Keith 2011). Furthermore, sellers can provide the 
information about prices which had been paid in the past, or they can inform about different 
types of reference prices. For example, Jang and Chu (2012) demonstrate that information 
about production cost and reference prices influences buyers’ behavior. Krawczyk, Kukla-
Gryz, and Tyrowicz (2015) show that for e-books, prices chosen by buyers are strongly 
influenced by average prices. Johnson and Cui (2013) illustrate that prices paid by buyers 
are influenced by the available information (information about minimum, maximum or 
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suggested prices), and that the seller’s revenue is largest when no information is provided. 
This is confirmed by Thomas and Gierl (2014), who find that buyers’ self-reported WTP is 
lower if a minimum price is provided compared to the case in which no information is 
provided. 
What are the reasons for the negative effect of information – in particular, the 
information about minimum prices – on buyers’ prices? A possible explanation refers to 
self image concerns and costs of control. If buyers have incomplete information about their 
own fairness, they can self-signal their fairness by paying positive prices. However, if a 
minimum price is set by the seller, the signal is weaker. In addition, a minimum price might 
be perceived as a signal of distrust, to which buyers could react by paying lower prices (see 
Falk and Kosfeld 2006). 
3.3 Deservingness 
Deservingness relates to the size and source of the dictator’s endowment. Ruffle (1998) 
studies DG in which the size of the dictator’s endowment is determined by the receiver. 
Receivers are engaged in an ability task (general knowledge and skill-testing questions) and 
receivers’ performance determines the dictators’ endowments. The dictator is endowed 
with $10 in the case the recipient she is matched with belongs to a group of recipients 
whose performance in the ability task is above the mean. This modification introduces a 
legitimate claim on the side of receivers: a receiver who exerted effort to increase the 
dictator’s endowment should be rewarded for her effort. Results show that dictators who 
received their endowments because receivers exerted effort, also choose higher transfers 
compared to dictators who received the same endowment based on a coin toss. 
This result is of relevance for PWYW because the seller, who produced the good or 
service and incurred the cost, has a legitimate claim on receiving a positive price. It is not 
unreasonable that buyers recognize this and hence pay positive prices. Assuming that the 
seller’s cost is related to the quality of the good, and that a buyer’s WTP increases with 
quality, sellers of high quality goods deserve higher prices. Support for this claim can be 
found in Jang and Chu (2012), who find that buyers are willing to pay more when informed 
about costs. 
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In this section we discussed how behavior in the DG and TG depend on three 
variables, social context, social information and deservingness. Knowledge of how these 
variables affect behavior is of crucial importance for PWYW pricing because these 
variables can be affected by the seller. By manipulating social context, social information 
and deservingness, sellers can influence prices that buyers will pay in non-repeated 
transactions. In the next section, we discuss whether this section’s results carry over to 
repeated games, which can be used to model repeated PWYW interactions between a buyer 
and a seller. 
4. PWYW as a Repeated Game 
So far, we have focused our discussion on one-shot games. Each game represents a single 
transaction between a buyer and a seller. Given that many buyer-seller interactions are 
repeated, one might ask whether the results from the previous section are valid also for 
repeated interactions. 
Repeated games are more complex. With the number of repetitions, the action space 
grows because players can condition their behavior in a specific period on the outcome of 
previous periods. For finitely repeated games, the subgame-perfect equilibrium can be 
found by backward induction. In the equilibrium of the finitely repeated DG and TG, 
players play the equilibrium of stage game in each period. In infinitely and indefinitely 
repeated games backward induction cannot be applied, either because there is no last 
period, or because the last period is unknown a priori. In addition to the finitely repeated 
games’ equilibria, new equilibria become possible. In these newly emerging equilibria, 
players cooperate in a sequence of actions and deviation is punished in future periods. 
An example could be a situation where the seller offers the good under a PWYW 
pricing mechanism only if the buyer’s payment covers costs. If the buyer pays less, the 
seller chooses another pricing mechanism. If buyer and seller put sufficient weight on 
future interactions, an equilibrium in the indefinitely repeated game is to pay under PWYW 
pricing a price that covers costs. One can conclude from this example that in a repeated 
game, behavior might be driven by motives other than the ones in one-shot games. Such 
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motives are strategic since they are linked to expected benefits of repeated interaction in the 
future. On the one hand, sellers might take action to create customer loyalty (invest in 
product quality or atmosphere or advertising) because they expect higher revenues in the 
future. On the other hand, buyers might pay prices above costs to keep the seller in business 
(Mak et al. 2015). 
With respect to strategic motives we formulate two questions. (1) Is behavior 
constant across several repetitions of the same game? (2) How does behavior change when 
new information is revealed through a repeated interaction? 
Regarding constant behavior, the question is how past behavior affects future 
behavior. Several studies find evidence for the effect of moral licensing. Good actions tend 
to be followed by bad actions and vice versa so that a balance is achieved. Licensing is 
driven by conflicting goals (Mullen and Monin 2016). In the DG, for example, the goal to 
be pro-social on the one hand and the goal to maximize one’s own payoff on the other 
hand, stand in conflict to each other. Evidence in support of moral licensing can be found 
on Brañas-Garza et al. (2013). They study a finitely repeated DG in which in each period 
dictators are matched with a new recipient and find that subjects who behaved nicely 
(selfish) in one period tend to behave selfish (nicely) in the subsequent period. 
However, there is also evidence showing to the opposite results and more in favor of 
constant individual behavior. Building on the theory of self-perception, Gneezy et al. 
(2012) argue that individual behavior depends of self-perception, and that self-perception is 
influenced by behavior in the past. Gneezy et al. (2012) find that costly pro-social behavior 
(in their case making a costly donation) affects individual self-perception so that 
individuals, who engage in costly pro-social behavior, show subsequent pro-social 
behavior. 
In the case that individuals have a desire to conform to a social norm but are 
uncertain about the norm, new information can affect behavior. For instance, information 
about others’ behavior can function as a signal about the norm (as already mentioned in 
section 3.2). Cason and Mui (1998) present evidence from a repeated DG where dictators’ 
generosity decreases if subjects are confronted with irrelevant information but does not 
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decrease if subjects receive relevant information. Applied to PWYW, this finding suggests 
that sellers can influence the success of PWYW pricing by providing information in order 
to establish and communicate a social norm about the appropriate price. Such information 
refers to, for instance, (1) product quality, (2) average prices paid by other buyers (see the 
discussion on reference prices), (3) the nature of the PWYW pricing itself (short-term 
promotional campaign vs. long-term business model), or (4) possible consequences for 
buyers if prices paid are too low (seller avoids this pricing mechanism or goes out of 
business). 
Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2004) study repeated trust games. In their experiment 
subjects play several repeated TG. Within each repeated TG the same two subjects interact 
repeatedly (partner matching), but between repeated games subjects change. In treatment 1 
the repeated game is a TG which is played five times, in treatment 2 the repeated game is a 
TG which after each period continues with probability 0.8. In treatment 1, subjects know 
that period 5 is the last period and can apply backward induction. In treatment 2, subjects 
never know if the current period will be the last period of the game, hence, they cannot 
apply backward induction. 
Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2004) find that in both treatments, trust decreases as the 
trust game is repeated with the same partner, and that trust is reset at high levels when a 
new game with a new partner begins. Regarding the trustor’s behavior in the sequence of 
repeated games, there is no difference in trust across treatments. For experienced subjects, 
however, trust decreases in treatment 1 but not in treatment 2. Overall, the results show that 
in repeated TG, trust remains high if the concern for the future is important. 
Results from repeated games highlight the importance of communication and the 
reduction of goal conflicts for the long-term success of PWYW pricing. This does not in 
any sense imply that the three factors that we identified in section 3, are not relevant in the 
long-term. Rather it is the case that communication and the reduction of goal conflicts – in 
addition to social context, social information, and deservingness – influence behavior in 
repeated games. Partly, short-term and long-term consideration reinforce each other. 
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5. Conclusion 
Given the fast growing literature on PWYW pricing and the vague references to the DG 
and the TG within this literature, we introduce the PWYW Game to analyze how PWYW 
pricing is related to the DG and the TG. Based on the similarity between the dictator’s 
decisions in the DG, the trustor’s decision in the TG, and the buyer’s decision in a typical 
PWYW transaction, we argue that the results from DG and TG experiments can generate 
useful insights for applications of PWYW pricing. More specifically, we consider such an 
analysis as necessary in order to identify those variables that can help a seller to make 
PWYW pricing a feasible pricing strategy, both in the short and in the long run. 
Since the DG and the TG are the workhorses of experimental economics, a number 
of experiments show how specific variables affect individual decisions. Given the similarity 
between a PWYW transaction and these games, we identify the factors that are relevant in 
DG and TG and can also be relevant for decisions in PWYW pricing situations. 
Particularly, we identify and discuss three factors which are likely to affect behavior in the 
DG, the TG, and buyers’ choices of how much to pay in a PWYW transaction. These three 
factors – (i) social context, (ii) social information, and (iii) deservingness – are most likely 
to affect a seller’s revenue in the short-term. 
In repeated interactions, (iv) communication and (v) the reduction of goal conflicts 
lead to more pro-social behavior and these factors are most likely to contribute to the 
success of PWYW pricing. In sum, the experimental results discussed in this paper show 
how abstract laboratory experiments can be used as a guidance in the search for an optimal 
pricing strategy. 
Closely related to the results from repeated experiments is the marketing literature 
on sequential choice, which discusses how past experiences affect choices (see Huber, 
Goldsmith, and Mogilner 2008). There are conceptual differences between both 
approaches. While the experimental economics literature is concerned with testing game-
theoretical predictions in abstract laboratory settings, the sequential choice literature is 
concerned with the psychological mechanisms that affect behavior. Nonetheless, we believe 
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that both approaches can complement each other in order to derive business policies for the 
success of PWYW pricing and other participative pricing models. 
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